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The Clarification of Tippee Liability Under Rule 10b-5: Dirks v. SEC' — With the
enactment of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934' (the 1934 Act), Congress created a
broad mechanism for regulating the purchase and sale of securities. By authority of
section I 0(b) of the 1934 Act,' the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) promul-
gated Rule I Ob-5,4 one of the primary antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws.'
Rule 101)-5 prohibits affirmative misrepresentations and half-truths in connection with
the purchase or sale of a security. Compliance with the mandates of Rule 101)-5 is effected
by the subjection of persons who violate the rule to both criminal liability in actions
brought by the Department of Justice ° and civil liability in actions brought by either the
SEC or private citizens.'
' Dirks v. SEC, 103 S. Ct. 3255 (1983).
• 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1982). For a detailed discussion of the 1934 Act, see Loomis, The
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 28 Gso. WASH. L. REV. 219
(1959).
3 Section 10(b) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any national
securities exchange —
(h) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security .. .
any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public
interest or for the protection of investors.
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982).
4 Rule 106-5 is codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.106-5 (1984) and states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national
securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of
any security.
Rule 106-5 was promulgated by the SEC in May, 1942. L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1426-27 (2d
ed. 1961) [hereinafter cited as L. Loss]. For a discussion of Rule 10h-5, see 3 L. Loss, supra, at
1421-74; 6 L. Loss, supra, at 3526-3647 (Stipp. 1969); A. BROMBERG & L. LOWENFELS, SECURITIES
PRAIA) & COMMODITIES FRAUD (1983) [hereinafter cited as BROMBERG & LOWENTELS].
• See A. Jacobs, The Impact of Rule 10b-5 (1980); 1 BROMBERG & LOWENEELS, supra note 4, at § 2.1.
• Criminal liability for violation of Rule 10b-5 is based on section 32(a) of the 1934 Act which
provides that persons willfully violating any provision of the Act may be subject to criminal penalties.
15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (1982). Comment. Civil Liability for Insider Trading Under Rule 10b-5: Should It
Depend on Fiduciary Relationships?, 1982 ARIZ. Sr. L. J. 965 (1982); Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S.
222, 225 & n.3 (1980). The Chiarella Court noted that Chiarella's conviction represented the first
instance "in which criminal liability ha[cli been imposed upon a purchaser for section 10(b) nondisc-
losure. Petitioner was sentenced to a year in prison, suspended except for one month, and a 5-year
term of probation." Id. at 235 n.20 (citations omitted).
▪ See, e.g., Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946). Both section 10(b)
of the 1934 Act and Rule 106-5 establish that certain conduct is unlawful, yet neither gives a private
right of action to a person injured by a violation thereof. Since both the Securities Act of 1933 in
sections 11, 12, 13 and 15 and , the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 in sections 9, 16 and 18
explicitly provide for civil liability, it is arguable that section 10(b) was never intended to provide for
any civil liability. See Ruder, Civil Liability Under Rule 106-5: Judicial Revision of the Legislative Intent, 57
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Although Rule lOb-5 does not explicitly proscribe nondisclosure of inside informa-
tion," the SEC and the courts have created a duty to disclose such information in certain
situations in which no affirmative misrepresentation has been made. 9 Liability for non-
disclosure has been founded upon a fiduciary duty inherent in a defendant's status as an
insider in the corporation in whose securities he is trading.° The focus on the elements of
status and fiduciary duty is a result of the fact that the rule has been interpreted with the
common law tort actions of fraud and deceit in mind." Under common law, nondisclo-
sure of inside information has been prohibited only when there is a duty to speak.'"
Silence, as opposed to a half-truth, has not been actionable at common law unless one
party "by concealment or other action intentionally prevents the other from acquiring
material information . '" or is under a duty to disclose "because of a fiduciary or other
similar relation of trust and confidence.'
One of the most significant developments to result from judicial interpretation of
Nw. U.L. REV. 627 (1963). However, beginning with Kardon in 1946 and in every case thereafter
which considered the question, a private right of action has been held available for a violation of Rule
I013-5. R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, SECURITIES REGULATION 808 (5th ed. 1982) [hereinafter cited as
JENNINGS & MARSH]. The United States Supreme Court in Superintendent of Insurance of New York
v, Bankers Life and Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971) recognized the availability of a private
damage action under section 10(b) and Rule 1013-5. In Rule 10b-5 private damage actions, the
Supreme Court has limited standing to bring such actions to purchasers and sellers of securities. Blue
Chip 'Stirrups v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 731-32 (1975) (Court held offerees, who had
neither purchased nor sold shares, could not maintain a private cause of action under Rule 1013-5).
8 Inside information has been defined as " 'information intended to be available only for a
corporate purpose and not for the personal benefit of anyone.' " SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401
F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969) (quoting In re Cady, Roberts
and Co„ 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 (1961)).
9 See infra note 18 and accompanying text. Information which the investor can reasonably be
expected to be aware of need not be disclosed. See Siebert v. Sperry Rand Corp., 586 F.2d 949, 952
(2c1 Cir. 1978).
"' Officers, directors and majority or controlling shareholders have been held to have the status
of "insiders." Cady, Roberts, 40 S.E.C. at 912. In has also been suggested that insider status be accorded
to independent contractors, such as outside legal counsel and independent certified public accoun-
tants who work for the corporation and arc privy to corporate information. JENNINGS & MARSH, supra
note 7, at 914 n.11. Section 16(b) of the 1934 Act defines insiders as directors, officers and 10%
beneficial owners. 15 U.S.C. § '78p (1982).
" It is not uncommon for judges to look to common law concepts since "statutes build on the
common law and, especially when statutes are new, judges and lawyers who are trained in the
common law are apt to look to it for guidance." 3 L. Loss, supra note 4, at 1430.
' 2 RESTATEMF,NT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551(2)(a) (1976) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT]. A
plaintiff pursuing a common law action for fraud is required to prove misrepresentation of a
material fact, as well as scienter, reliance, causation, privity and damages. Id. at § 525. The early
common law, based on the tradition of caveat eniptor, did not prohibit trading on nondisclosed
information, provided there had been no affirmative misrepresentation. See generally 1 F. HARPER &
F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 7.14 (1956).
13 RESTATEMENT, supra note 12, at § 550.
14 RESTATF.MENT,SUpra note 12, at § 551(2)(a). See generally W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 697
(4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER]. The types of confidential or fiduciary relations which
supported a duty to disclose were narrowly defined: Brasher v. First Nat'l Bank, 232 Ala. 340, 168
So. 42 (1936) (bank and investing depositor); McDonough v. Williams, 77 Ark. 261, 92 S.W. 783
(1905) (principal and agent); Foreman v. Henry, 87 Oki. 272, 210 P. 1026 (1922) (executor and
beneficiary of an estate). The relationship of tenant in common, for instance, did not carry with it, in
the absentee of fraud, a duty of full disclosure. Neill v. Shamburg, 158 Pa. 263, 27 A. 992 (1893).
Certain types of contracts, such as those of suretyship and guaranty, insurance and partnership, were
deemed to create confidential relations. PROSSER, supra, at 697-98.
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Rule 10b-5 is the disclose-or-abstain rule.' Under this rule, persons in possession of
material" inside information must either publicly disclose that information before trad-
ing or refrain from trading in or recommending the securities involved until the informa-
tion is disclosed.' The duty to disclose-or-abstain was initially limited to corporate
officers, directors and controlling shareholders.' Subsequently, however, the SEC and
the courts broadened the reach of Rule I Ob-5 by expanding the category of persons who
owe a duty to disclose-or-abstain," In the seminal case of In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 0 the
SEC held that persons who receive tips from corporate insiders, so-called "tippees," may
be held liable for trading on inside information.' Similarly, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co," and Shapiro v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, I nc. 23 stated that Rule I Ob-5 applied to tippees as well as to
corporate insiders,'14
See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968) (en bane), cert. denied, 394
U.S, 976 (1969); see generally Brudney, Insiders, Outsiders, and Other informational Advantages Under the
Federal Securities Laws, 93 HAW/. 1. REV. .322 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Brudney].
18 The Texas Gulf Sulphur court has stated that " 'The basic test of materiality .. is whether a
reasonable man would attach importance in determining his choice of action in the transaction in
question . . . This, of course, encompasses any fact . . . which in reasonable and objective
contemplation might affect the value of the corporation's stock or securities .. " 401 F.2d at 849
(quoting List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462 (1965)) (emphasis in original).
' 7
 Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 848-49; Recent Decisions, Insider Trading — The Extension of the
Duty to Disclose Material Inside Information, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 132, 133 (1982) [hereinafter cited
as Recent Decisions, Insider Trading].
See , e.g. , SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en bone), cert. denied, 394
U.S. 976 (1969) (corporate insiders have duty to disclose material inside information or refrain from
trading); Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808 (D. Del. 1951) (controlling shareholder who
purchased shares from minority shareholder has duty to disclose both the appreciated value of
inventory not revealed in annual report and the intent to liquidate corporation); Kardon v. National
Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa. 1947) (directors of corporation have duty to disclose to selling
shareholders tact that directors had arranged for sale to third corporation for price higher than book
value offered to selling shareholders). See infra notes 65-81 and 104-11 and accompanying text.
19 See Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228, 237-38 (2d Cir.
1974), where the Second Circuit imposed Rule 106-5 liability on institutional investor-tippees who
were given information about an impending decline in Douglas Aircraft earnings and sold before the
information became public; In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 (1961), where a member of
the board of directors of the Curtiss-Wright corporation tipped a broker-dealer regarding a decision
by the board to reduce the corporation's dividends. The broker-dealer was found liable by the SEC
for selling Curtiss-Wright shares on the basis of the tip; In re Honohan, 13 S.E.C. 754, 756 (1943),
where the SEC, in a disciplinary proceeding, found a broker-dealer liable as a tippee for submitting
bids on the basis of inside information he had derived from a corporate employee of the issuer.
" 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961). See infra notes 83-94 and accompanying text.
" Id. at 912.
401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en bane), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974).
21 The Texas Gulf Sulphur court stated, "As Darke's 'tippees' are not defendants in this action, we
need not decide whether, if they acted with actual or constructive knowledge that the material
information was undisclosed, their conduct is as equally violative of the Rule as the conduct of their
insider source, though we note that it certainly could be equally reprehensible." Texas Gulf Sulphur,
401 F.2d at 852-53.
In Shapiro, the Second Circuit stated that one of the primary purposes of Rule 106-5 was to deter
corporate insiders and their tippees from taking unfair advantage of uninformed investors. Shapira,
495 F.2d at 235. The Shapiro court found that the defendant-tippees "knew or should have known of
the confidential corporate source of the revised earnings information and ... knew of its nonpublic
nature, land therefore] were under a duty not to trade in Douglas stock without publicly disclosing
such information." U. at 238.
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Although the SEC and the Second Circuit stated that tippees could he held liable
under Rule 10b-5, the theoretical basis for the extension of liability by the SEC in Cady,
Roberts was quite different front that relied upon by the Second Circuit. The SEC in Cady,
Roberts adopted the "fiduciary" theory to define the boundaries of the duty to disclose-or-
abstain."' The fiduciary theory protects the relationship of trust between the insider and
the shareholders of the corporation by mandating that when the insider's interest in his
own profit or loss conflicts with his duty to protect the shareholders' interests, the latter's
interests must prevail.'" Thus, if an insider trades on nonpublic material information
without_ first publicly disclosing such information and profits thereby, he has breached his
fiduciary duty." To further protect this relationship of trust, the SEC in Cady, Roberts
extended the duty to disclose-or-abstain to tippees so that insiders could not use inter-
mediaries, such as tippees, as proxies to trade for them and thereby avoid their duty to
disclose-or-abstain . 28
The Second Circuit, in contrast, adopted the "information" theory to interpret the
scope of the Rule lOb-5 duty." Under this theory, anyone who possesses material inside
information has a duty to either disclose the information or abstain from trading. 3° This
theory espouses informational parity: all investors in the market should have equal access
to all material investment information . 31
The difference in theoretical approaches taken by the SEC and the Second Circuit is
a crucial one because the extent of the duty tinder Rule lOb-5 depends upon the theory
chosen. A court adopting the fiduciary theory would extend the duty to disclose-or-
abstain only to traders who are in a relationship of trust with the shareholders of the
corporaticm. Those persons outside the trust relationship could trade on their inside
" Cady, Roberts, 40 S.E.C. at 912.
" See Recent Decisions, Insider Trading, supra note 17, at 137. Judge Wright, in Dirks v. SEC, 681
F.2d 824 (D.C. Cir. 1982), stated that the fiduciary theory is concerned with the "unfairness and
fraud" which results when traders or their informants "profit at the expense or to the exclusion of
those who have placed trust in them." Id, at 835. Judge Wright went on to state that traditional
fiduciary relationships include those "between a corporate director and the corporation's sharehold-
ers, or a similar relationship of trust, as between employers and employees or investment bankers
and their clients." Id.
" See Cady, Roberts, 40 S.E.C. at 916 & n.31. The SEC in Cady, Roberts provided the following
description of the duties a fiduciary owes to his beneficiary: "[H]e would have a duty not to take a
position adverse to them, not to take secret profits at their expense, not to misrepresent facts to them,
and in general to place their interest ahead of his own." Id. at 916 n.31. The SEC also stated that "[a]
significant purpose of the Exchange Act was to eliminate the idea that the use of inside information
for personal advantage was a normal emolument of corporate office." Id. at 912 n.15.
" The SEC in Cady, Roberts stated that the tipper's position as a director in the corporation
"clearly prohibited him from selling the securities affected by the information without disclosure."Id.
at 912. The SEC went on to state that "(b]y logical sequence, it should prohibit the tipped]." Id.
at 1450.
25
 Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 848-49.
" Id. at 848.
a' Id. at 849. Judge Wright, in Dirks v. SEG, 681 F.2d 824 (D.C. Cir. 1982), stated that those
cases adopting the information theory "imply that the securities laws impose a duty to disclose or
refrain from trading based on the nature of the undisclosed information."1d. at 835. Judge Wright,
however, went on to state that "full equality of access to information is an illusory goal." Id. at 835
n.14. See Herman, Equity Funding, Inside Information, and the Regulators, 21 UCLA L. REV. 1, 17-28
(1973) [hereinafter cited as Herman] (discussing practicality of information theory).
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information with impunity. In contrast, a court adopting the information theory would
impose a duty to disclose-or-abstain upon any trader who possesses inside information. 32
The United States Supreme Court in Chiarella v. United States 33 settled this theoretical
controversy by adopting the fiduciary theory as the basis upon which to interpret the
scope of Rule 10b-5. 34 Although the issue of tipper liability was not presented to the
Supreme Court in Chiarella, the Court left open the possibility that a tipper could he
viewed as a "participant after the fact" in
.7the insider's breach of his fiduciary duty to the
corporate shareholders." Not until Dirks v. SEC, 3" however, was the Supreme Court
directly presented with the issue of whether a tippee of material inside information could
be held liable for nondisclosure under Rule 10b-5.
Raymond Dirks was a highly respected securities analyst specializing in insurance
company securities with the New York broker-dealer firm, Delafield Childs, Inc. 37 On
March 6, 1973, Dirks was contacted by Ronald Secrist, a former officer of Equity Funding,
a corporation primarily engaged in selling life insurance and mutual funds.' Secrist told
Dirks that the assets of Equity Funding had been vastly overstated as a result of fraudu-
lent practices within the corporation," and he provided Dirks with the names of present
and former Equity Funding officers and employees who could support his allegations. 40
After informing Dirks that a number of regulatory agencies had failed to take any action
3_'
	 Judge Wright stated in Dirks v. SEC, 681 F.2d 824 (D.C. Cir. 1982), the information theory
states 'that all investors should have equal access to information that a reasonable investor would
consider material to investment decisions, and that any trade in which only one party had an
opportunity to learn and did learn such information is inherently unfair." Id. at 835.
33
 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
34 Id. at 230. The Chiarella Court stated:
[Section 10(b)1 liability is premised upon a duty to disclose arising front a relationship of
trust and confidence between parties to a transaction. Application of a duty to disclose
prior to trading guarantees that corporate insiders, who have an obligation to place the
shareholder's welfare before their own, will not benefit personally through fraudulent
use of material, nonpublic information.
Id. See infra notes 120-34 and accompanying text.
3' Id. at 230 n.12.
'6 103 S. Ct. 3255 (1983).
" Dirks v. SEC, 681 F.2d 824, 829 (D.C. Cir. 1982). Dirks had a reputation for conducting
aggressive and independent investigations of the companies on which he reported. Brief for
Petitioner at 7, Dirks v. SEC, 103 S. Ct. 3255 (1983).
a' Dirks, 681 F.2d at 829. Secrist had recently been fired from Bankers National, a New jersey
life insurance company which had been acquired by Equity Funding. Id. Both the majority and
dissenting opinions in the Dirks Supreme Court decision, without discussion, assigned Secrist the
status of "insider," even though at the time of his disclosure to Dirks he was a former Equity Funding
officer. Dirks, 103 S. Ct. at 3267-68, 3269.
39 Id. Secrist told Dirks that Equity Funding had been creating false insurance files since 1970. In
re Raymond L. Dirks, 21 S.E.C. Docket 1401, 1402 (1981). The false pellicles had been sold to
reinsurance companies For an amount equal to 80% of the first year premiums. Id. at 1402. Equity
Funding management hoped that the false policy sales would increase the value of Equity Funding
stock. Id. To perpetuate the fraud, Equity Funding had to create medical files and death-certificates
for nonexistent policyholders. Id. at 1402-03.
Secrist also contended that Equity Funding had been selling partnerships in nonexistent real
estate, that Equity Funding had had connections with the Mafia, and that Equity Funding's former
accountant had become suspicious of Equity Funding and had dropped the account. Dirks, 681 F.2d
at 829-30. The SEC ultimately determined that none of these latter allegations was true. Brief for
Petitioner at 8, Dirks v. SEC, 103 S. Ct. 3255 (1983).
" Dirks, 21 S.E.C. Docket at 1403.
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when informed of these charges by other Equity Funding officers and employees, Secrist
urged Dirks to disclose the fraud publicly. Dirks went to Los Angeles, the corporate
headquarters of Equity Funding, to talk to corporate management and the Equity Fund-
ing officers and employees who Secrist had told him could corroborate his story." While
investigating Secrist's charges, Dirks also spoke with members of the investment commu-
nity in an effort to determine if Secrist's allegations had any substance.'' Dirks conveyed
the information he obtained from these convevations, including any information which
undermined Secrist's allegations, to his institutional clients and to other investors."
During the period of his investigation, Dirks also urged William Blundell, the Wall Street
Journal's Los Angeles bureau chief, to write an article on the allegations of fraud at Equity
Funding." Blundell refused to write the story, stating that he feared that publishing such
damaging accusations might subject thefournal to an action for libel." After the purchase
price of Equity Funding stock fell from $26 per share to under $15 per share during the
two week period in which Dirks was investigating and spreading word of Secrist's charges,
the New York Stock Exchange, on March 27, 1973, halted trading in Equity Funding
stock." The SEC stopped trading in Equity Funding securities on March 28 47 and filed a
complaint against Equity Funding on April 2." A few days later, Equity Funding filed a
petition in bankruptcy." After conducting an investigation into Dirks' role in the expo-
sure of the fraud at Equity Funding, the SEC charged Dirks and five of his institutional
clients in an SEC disciplinary proceeding with violating Rule 10b-5." An administrative
law judge found that Dirks' clients had violated Rule 106-5 by trading on material inside
information without first ptiblicly disclosing such information, and that Dirks had violated
Rule 1013-5 by tipping material inside information." The administrative law judge cen-
" Id, at 1403. Dirks visited the president and executive vice-president of Equity Funding. Id.
They both denied Secrist's allegations, pointing out that three insurance examiners from three states
had found nothing wrong at Equity Funding. Id. Dirks also met with two of Secrist's principal
collaborators, Patrick Hopper and Frank Majerus. Dirks, 681 F.2d at 830. Hopper was a former
vice-president in charge of investments fOr one of Equity Funding's insurance subsidiaries. Id.
Hopper alleged that fictitious insurance had been discussed openly at Equity Funding, sales figures
were highly irregular, and nonexistent assets were on Equity Funding's books. Dirks, 21 S.E.C.
Docket at 1403. Majerus, a former Equity Funding comptroller, admitted he personally had falsified
ledgers in 1970 to hide the fictitious policies being carried on Equity Funding's books. Id.
" Dirks, .681 F.2d at 831.
43 Id. On March 12, Dirks contacted Boston Company Institutional Investors, Inc., a registered
investment advisor. Dirks, 21 S.E.C. Docket at 1403. On March 15 and 16, Boston Co. sold $1.2
million worth of Equity Funding securities. Id. On March 2, Boston Co. liquidated its clients'
remaining holdings of more than $7.5 million of Equity Funding securities. Id. at 1404. Dirks
subsequently contacted the Dreyfus Corporation, which sold a recently acquired $500,000 Equity
Funding debenture. Id, at 1405. In addition, Dirks contacted Tomlin, Zimmerman & Parmlee, which
liquidated all of its clients' Equity Funclitig holdings of more than $487,000. Id.
44 Id.
15 Id.
46 Id.
" Id. at 1405-06.
Dirks, 681 F.2d at 832. For the full text of the Complaint and Final Judgment of Permanent
Injunction and Appointment of Special Investigator and Director, see SEC v. Equity Funding Corp.
of Am., [1973 Transfer Binder] Er.n. Sic. L. REP. (CCH) 93,917 (C.D. Cal. April 3, 1973).
" Dirks, 21 S.E.C. Docket at 1406.
" Id. The five institutional clients were the Boston Company Institutional Investors, Inc., The
Dreyfus Corporation, John W. Bristol and Co., Tomlin, Zimmerman & Parmlee, Inc. and Manning
and Napier. Id.
51 Id. at 1412.
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sured four of the five trading clients and recommended that Dirks be suspended from
associating with a broker or dealer for sixty days." Dirks and the SEC Enforcement
Division appealed the administrative law judge's decision to the SEC." The SEC found
that Dirks had aided and abetted violations by his clients of section 17(a) 54 of the Securities
Act of 1933 and section 10(b) of the 1934 Act and Rule 10b-5 thereunder." The SEC,
however, reduced the sanction imposed upon Dirks to a censure in order not to "hamper
legitimate investigative securities analysis." 56
Dirks sought review in the UniteeStates Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit." The District of Columbia Circuit Court affirmed the SEC's order,
finding that Dirks had breached his duty of disclosure under Rule 10b-5. 58 The court
explained that its finding that Dirks was liable could be based on either of two theories.
First, the court stated that the duty to disclose-or-abstain was based on an ethical standard
that applied to broker-dealers, and Dirks had breached that duty by failing to report to
the SEC and to the public what he knew." Second, the court stated that Dirks was a tippee
because he had obtained the allegations of fraud from Equity Funding insiders and thus
automatically acquired a Rule 1013-5 duty to disclose-or-abstain, a duty which he breached
when he repeated the allegations to others who traded." Dirks subsequently petitioned
the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, which was granted. 6 ' In a six-to-three decision,
the Supreme Court reversed the District of Columbia Circuit Court's ruling and held that
Raymond Dirks was not liable under Rule 10b-5 for failing to disclose material inside
information which he had received from insiders of Equity Funding. 62
The Dirks decision is significant for two reasons. First, the Court clarified the basis
upon which tippee liability is founded by firmly rejecting the information theory as the
Id. Dreyfus was the only client not censured. Id. at 1402 n. I .
53 Id. at 1412. The SEC Enforcement Division sought imposition of a longer suspension against
Dirks. Dirks' clients did not appeal their censure. Id.
54 Section 17(a) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities by the use of any
means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce or by
the use of the mails, directly or indirectly —
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or
(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a material
fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements
made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.
15	 § 77q(a) (1982).
Dirks, 21 S.E.C. Docket at 1412.
56 Id. The SEC noted Dirks' role in uncovering the Equity Funding fraud and his unblemished
record as an analyst for 20 years. Id.
51 Dirks v. SEC, 681 F.2d 824 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
58 Id. at 839. When Dirks first petitioned for review in the District of Columbia Circuit Court, a
split panel of the court issued a three-paragraph judgment denying the petition for the reasons given
by the SEC in its ruling. Brief for Petitioner at 4, Dirks v. SEC, 103 S. Ct. 3255 (1983). Dirks filed a
Petition for Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc. Id. The petition was denied but the
court issued an opinion written by Judge Wright. Id. Judge Robb concurred in the result; only Judge
Tamm dissented,. Id.
" Dirks, 681 F.2d at 840.
6° Id. at 839.
61 Dirks v. SEC, 103 S. Ct. 371 (1982).
62
 Dirks, 103 S. Ct. at 3268.
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theoretical underpinning for determining the scope of tippee liability under Rule I Ob-5. 65
Second, by adopting the fiduciary theory as the basis of tippee liability under Rule 10b-5,
the Court restored the financial incentive necessary to encourage the private investigation
of securities fraud."' The first section of this casenote will discuss the historical develop-
ment of the duty to disclose-or-abstain and the persons upon whom the duty has been
imposed. The second section will summarize the majority and dissenting opinions in
Dirks. The third section will present the Court's reasoning in Dirks and will develop the
thesis that the Dirks case was correctly decided. Finally, the fourth section will analyze the
impact the Dirks decision will have on the private investigation of securities fraud. It will
be submitted that, by limiting the potential that market analysts will be held liable under
Rule 10b-5 for revealing instances of securities fraud, the decision will have the beneficial
impact of encouraging the private investigation of securities fraud.
1. HISTORICAL DF.VELOPN1ENT OF THE DUTY TO DISCLOSE-OR-ABSTAIN
The first persons upon whom the courts imposed the Rule 10b-5 duty to disclose
material inside information or abstain from trading were corporate officers and direc-
tors.° In Kardon v. National Gypsum Co.," corporate officers and directors were held to
have violated Rule 10b-5 even though they had made no affirmative misrepresentations
or half-truths."' The plaintiffs and defendants in Kardon were the sole shareholders in a
corporation in which they were also the corporate officers and directors: 4' Without the
plaintiffs' knowledge, the defendants arranged to sell the corporation's plant and equip-
ment to another corporation .69 The defendants then purchased all of the stock owned by
the plaintiffs without disclosing the planned sale." In the ensuing litigation, the defen-
dants argued that they could be held accountable as trustees only for proven lost corpo-
rate profits. 7 ' The Kardon court rejected the defendants' argument and imposed an
affirmative duty on all corporate officers and directors to disclose material information
regarding the corporation before trading in its securities. The court based this duty on
the fiduciary obligations inherent in the insider status of the defendants."
The class of persons under a duty to disclose-or-abstain was expanded in Speed v.
63 See by'ra notes 145-50 and accompanying text.
64 See infra notes 213-19 and accompanying text.
65 See Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798, 802 (E.D. Pa. 1947); Comment,
Rationalizing Liability for Nondisclosure Under 10b-5: Equal Access to Information and United States v.
Chiarella, 1980 Wts. L. REV. 162. 167 (1980).
66
	 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa. 1947). Although the 1934 Act does not provide explicitly for a
private cause of action under section 10(b), such a cause of action was initially implied in Kardon. Id.
at 802-03. See supra note 7.
67 Id. at 800.
68 M. at 801.
69 Id. at 802.
70 Id. at 801.
" Id. at 801-02.
72 Id. at 802. The court rejected the necessity of proving lost profits:
It is not necessary that they [prove lost profits]. The plaintiffs' case was established
when the defendants' duty and its breach were proved. This was done by showing that
the defendants were officers and directors of Western and that they disposed of the
bulk of their corporate assets to an outsider, for their own benefit, without disclosing
the transaction to the plaintiffs . . . .
Id.
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Transamerica." In Speed, the court held that majority shareholders are prohibited from
trading on inside information because they are in a fiduciary relationship with the
minority shareholders. The court stated that the duty to disclose-or-abstain applied
whether or not the majority shareholders were also corporate directors or officers. 71 In
Speed, the majority stockholder made a written offer to the minority stockholders to
purchase their siock. 75 After accepting the offer, the minority stockholders brought a class
action suit. against the majority shareholder. The suit alleged that the majority share-
holder had breached his fiduciary duty by releasing an annual report and letter which
failed to disclose material information regarding a significant increase in the value of the
corporation and the defendant's intention to liquidate the corporation in the near fu-
ture.76 The court found that the defendant's failure to disclose this information was a
violation of Rule 10b-5." In reaching its decision, the court relied principally on the
defendant's status as a majority stockholder, 78 a position which the court equated to that
of an officer or direcior. 79 According to the court, insider liability under Rule 10b-5 is
based upon a relationship of trust and confidence between the shareholders of the
corporation and those insiders, whatever their positions, who have obtained confidential
information because of their position within the corporation." This relationship, in the
court's view, gives rise to an affirmative duty to disclose-or-abstain because of the "neces-
sity of preventing a corporate insider from (taking) ... unfair advantage of the unin-
formed minority stockholders.""'
The Kardon and Speed courts interpreted Rule 10b-5 as imposing a duty upon
corporate directors, officers and controlling shareholders to disclose material information
before trading, based on their fiduciary status. In subsequent cases, both the SEC and the
courts expanded the category of persons subject to the duty to disclose-or-abstain under
Rule 10b-5.'' For example, in In re Cady, Roberts & Co. , 83 a stockbroker, while serving as a
director of a corporation, learned that the corporation planned to reduce its dividend,"
" 99 F. Stipp. 808 (I). Del. 1951).
" Id. at 833, 843.
" Id. at 812.
" Id.
" Id.
78 The court emphasized the importance of the defendant's status in imposing the duty to
disclose: "One of the primary purposes of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ... was to outlaw the
use of inside information by corporate officers and principal stockholders for their own financial
advantage to the detriment of uninformed public security holders." Id. at 829 (citation omitted).
" Id. The court stated:
[Rule 10b-5] is clear. It is unlawful for an insider, such as a majority stockholder, to
purchase the stock of minority stockholders without disclosing material facts affecting
the value of the stock, known to the majority stockholder by virtue of his inside position
but not known to the selling minority stockholders, which information would have
affected the judgment of the sellers.
Id. at 828-29.
8° Id.
Si Id. at 829 (parentheses supplied by the court).
" See Shapiro v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974)
(tippees), see infra notes 112.19 and accompanying text; SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d
833, 852-53 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969) (court indicated in dictum that
tippees could be held liable under Rule 106-5), see infra notes 104-11 and accompanying text; In re
Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 (1961) (persons in special relationship with company subject
to Rule 106-5, even though not insiders), see infra notes 83-94 and accompanying text.
" 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
" Id. at 909.
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The director disclosed this information to one of' the partners in his broker-dealer firm,
who then sold some of the firm's stock in the corporation without disclosing the inside
information to the purchasers. 85 In holding that the partner's sales violated Rule 10b-5,"
the SEC extended liability under Rule IOb-5 to include "tippees," those who receive tips
from corporate insiders. 87 According to the SEC, this extension was necessary to prevent
corporate insiders from evading Rule 10b-5 liability by giving material inside information
to outsiders."
The SEC began its opinion by stating that although the duty to disclose-or-abstain
had been placed principally upon corporate insiders, this group was not the exclusive
class of persons upon whom such a duty rested," Two elements that must be present to
establish a Rule 10b-5 violation were articulated by the SEC. According to the SEC, the
first element is the existence of a relationship affording access to inside information
intended to be available only for a corporate purpose. The second element is a determina-
tion that allowing the corporate insider to take advantage of the inside information by
trading without disclosure would be unfair to the person who purchases from, or sells to,
the corporate insider." In considering the matter before it, the SEC explained that it was
primarily concerned with determining whether the defendant-tippee was in a special
relationship with the corporation that provided him with access to information not
otherwise available." The SEC found that because the insider-broker's relationship to the
company as a director prohibited him from selling the securities without disclosure, by
"logical sequence" the clefendant-tippee should also be prohibited from profiting without
disclosure."
The SEC imposed liability on the defendant-tippee not because of the privileged
access the defendant had to the material nonpublic information, but rather because of the
special relationship which the person who had tipped this information had with the
corporation whose securities were traded. 93
 In Cady, Roberts, therefore, the SEC extended
the duty to disclose-or-abstain to tippees based upon the fiduciary theory," To protect the
fiduciary relationship between the insider and the shareholders, the SEC extended the
disclose-or-abstain duty to persons who receive material nondisclosed information from
an insider, because their trading would cause an indirect violation of the trust relationship
86 Id.
96 Id. at 912.
6' The SEC had recognized tippee liability under Rule 10b-5 in an earlier case, In re Honohan,
13 S.E.C. 754 (1943). A broker-dealer was able to underbid other bondholders because of inside
information he received from a corporate insider of the issuer. Id. at 756. The SEC found him liable
under Rule lOb-5 as a tippee of a corporate insider. Id. at 758.
" Professor Loss has noted: "Whatever duty of disclosure Rule 10b-5 imposes upon officers,
directors and controlling persons could be readily bypassed if the same duty were not held to devolve
at least upon members of their immediate families." 3 L. Loss, supra note 4, at 1450.
99 Cady, Roberts, 40 S.E.C. at 912. The SEC acknowledged that three categories, directors,
officers and controlling shareholders, had previously been held liable, but now stated that these
categories "do not exhaust the classes of persons upon whom there is such an obligation." Id.
Id.
9 ' Id. "Thus our task here is to identify those persons who are in a special relationship with a
company and privy to its internal affairs, and thereby suffer correlative duties in trading in its
securities. Intimacy demands restraint lest the uninformed be exploited." Id.
92 Id. at 916.
93 Id.
" Under this theory, when an insider's interest in personal gain conflicts with his fiduciary duty
to protect the stockholders' interests, the stockholders' interests must prevail. Id. at 916.
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between the corporate insider and the stockholders. The SEC concluded that corporate
insiders should not be able to do indirectly what they are prevented from doing directly as
individuals.
Subsequently, in In re Investors Management Co., Inc. ,95 the SEC expanded the category
of persons subject to the disclose-or-abstain duty by adopting a theory which imposed
even broader liability on tippees. In Investors Management Co., the SEC held the
defendant-tippees liable not because of the existence of a special relationship with the
corporation, as it had in Cady, Roberts, but rather on the basis of the mere receipt of
nonpublic information." Several of the defendants had received nonpublic information
regarding a drop in per-share earnings and projected earnings from a prospective
managing underwriter of a public offering of Douglas Aircraft securities. 9? Subsequently,
the defendants sold their Douglas stock without revealing the nonpublic information they
had received." The SEC held that whenever individuals receive information which they
know emanates from a corporate source and which places them in a position superior to
that of other investors, they have a duty to disclose that information or abstain from
trading under Rule lob-5. 99
Although the SEC did not base its imposition of liability in Investors Management Co.
solely on the defendants' receipt of nonpublic information, requiring also a shoWing that
the information had emanated from a corporate source, the decision indicated that the
underlying rationale for imposing a duty to disclose-or-abstain under Rule 10b-5 was
shifting from the fiduciary theory which the SEC relied upon in Cady, Roberts and toward
the adoption of an "information" theory. 10° The information theory is based on the view
that an investor who possesses inside information should not benefit at the expense of
other investors who do not have access to the same nonpublic information.' This theory
assumes that enhancement of the ability of all investors to have equal access to material
investment information was one of the major reasons for the enactment of the federal
securities laws."' The aim of the information theory, therefore, is to protect investors
entering the market from suffering losses because another investor has taken advantage
of information not available to the rest of the investing public.m
95 44 S.E.C. 633 (1971).
S" Id. at 635.
97
 Id. at 636.
98 Id. at 636-37.
99 Id. at 644. The SEC stated:
Our formulation would clearly attach responsibility in a situation where the recipient
knew or had reason to know the information was obtained by industrial espionage,
commercial bribery or the like .... Our test would not attach responsibility with respect
to information which is obtained by general observation or analysis.
Id. at 641 n.18.
10° At one point in its decision, the SEC came close to adopting a rule based on possession alone:
Considerations of both fairness and effective enforcement demand that the standard as
to the requisite knowledge be satisfied by proof that the recipient had reason to know of
the non-public character of the information, and that it not be necessary to establish
actual knowledge of that fact or, as suggested by respondents, of a breach of fiduciary
duty.
Id, at 644.
'°' Recent Decisions, Insider Trading, supra note 17, at 137-38.
1 " See Herman, supra note 31, at 17-28.
in See Brudney, supra note 15, at 353-67 (arguing that policy underlying section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5 is similar to policy underlying the information theory).
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit adopted the information
theory as the basis of liability under Rule 106-5 in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co .H" In Texas
Gulf Sulphur, company officials who possessed confidential information regarding a cop-
per strike purchased Texas Gulf Sulphur stock without disclosing the nonpublic informa-
tion to the sellers. ] °' The Second Circuit held that anyone in possession of material inside
information is an "insider" and therefore subject to the duty to disclose-or-abstain. The
court began its analysis by stating that the policy foundation of Rule 106-5 is the expecta-
tion that all investors have relatively equal access to material information.' The court
quoted the two elements which the SEC in Cady, Roberts had laid down as the basis for
imposing liability under Rule 106-5.'" In quoting the first element from Cady, Roberts,
however, the Texas Gulf SUlphur court omitted the reference to the requirement of the
existence of a fiduciary relationship to find liability. The SEC in Cady, Roberts had stated
that the first criterion for establishing liability under Rule 10b-5 is "the existence of a
relationship giving access" to inside information.'" The Texas Gulf Sulphur court, how-
ever, quoted the first element simply as "access" to inside information.' 03 According to the
Texas Gulf Sulphur court, "anyone in possession of material inside information must either
disclose it to the investing public, or, . must abstain from trading in or recommending
the securities concerned while such information remains undisclosed."' Although the
defendants in Texas Gulf Sulphur were tippers and not tippees, the court indicated that the
broad principles it enunciated could encompass tippees as well.'"
In the subsequent case of Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,"' the
Second Circuit directly addressed the issue of tippee liability under Rule 10b-5. 13 The
Shapiro court imposed liability on institutional investor-tippees who had been given
information about an impending decline in Douglas Aircraft Company earnings and then
sold their holdings in Douglas stock before the information became public." 4 The infor-
mation initially had passed properly from Douglas to Merrill Lynch in the course of
Merrill Lynch's preparation to underwrite Douglas' debentures." 5 Merrill Lynch, how-
ever, also passed the inside information to a select group of its institutional clients who
then sold their shares of Douglas stock without disclosure."' The court interpreted Rule
10b-5- as a provision designed to protect the uninformed investing public from being
taken advantage of by corporate insiders or their tippees.''' Citing Texas Gulf Sulphur, the
401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
l's Id. at 844.
'° Id. at 848. The court stated, The core of Rule 10b-5 is the implementation of the Con-
gressional purpose that all investors should have equal access to the rewards of participation in
securities transactions." Id. at 851-52.
107 Id. at 848. See supra notes 83-94 and accompanying text.
'" Cady, Roberts, 40 S.E.C. at 912.
1 " Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 848.
no Id.
"' Id. at 852 - 53. See supra note 24.
1 " 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974).
"3 The defendant-tippees in Shapiro were the same parties who were subject to SEC administra-
tive proceedings in In re Investors Management Co., Inc., 44 S.E.C. 633 (1971). See supra notes 95-103
and accompanying text.
1 " Shapiro, 495 F.2d at 232- 33.
11 ' Id. at 232.
11' Id.
" 7 Id. at 235. The court stated," 'The essential purpose of Rule 10h-5 ... is to prevent corporate
insiders and their tippees from taking unfair advantage of the uninformed outsiders.'"Id. (quoting
Radiation Dynamics, Inc. v. Goldmuntz, 464 F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 1972)).
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Shapiro court stated that anyone in possession of material inside information must disclose
it to the public or refrain from trading.' Even though the tippees in Shapiro had no
confidential relationship with Douglas, the court found them liable for violating Rule
10b-5." 5 Thus, in both Texas Gulf Sulphur and Shapiro, the Second Circuit rejected the
fiduciary theory enunciated by the SEC in Cady, Roberts and instead adopted the informa-
tion theory as the basis of insider and tippee liability under Rule I Ob-5.
The United States Supreme Court resolved the conflict between these two theories of
liability in Chiarella v. United States.'" In Chiarella, the Court reversed the criminal convic-
tion of an employee of a financial printer who had been convicted of violating Rule 106-5
for purchasing securities based on knowledge of nonpublic market information which he
had acquired in the course of his employment,'" Chiarella, a mark-up person at Pandick
Press, handled documents which announced corporate takeover bids."' Until the night of
the final printing, the true names of' the acquiring and target corporations were concealed
by fictitious names or blank spaces." 3 Chiarella, however, had deduced the true identities
before the final printing and had purchased stock in the target companies without
disclosing his information publicly." 4 The Court found the SEC's emphasis in Cady,
Roberts on the existence of a fiduciary relationship as the basis of the Rule 10b-5 duty to
disclose-or-abstain to be fully consistent with the common law of fratid.'' 5 Under the
common law, the Court noted, the duty to disclose is imposed when one party has
information which the other party has a right to know because of a fiduciary or similar
relationship of trust and confidence between them." The protection of the shareholders'
trust and confidence in corporate management, the Court concluded, should serve as the
basis for imposing the duty to -disclose-or-abstain tinder Rule I Ob-5." 7 In so concluding,
the Court rejected the formulation of a duty to disclose-or-abstain founded on the
assumption that the federal securities laws created a system of equal access to inside
information. Adoption of the information theory as the basis for Rule 101)-5 liability, the
Court noted, would mandate recognizing a general duty between all participants in
market transactions to forego actions based on inside information.' 28 The Court stated
that it was unwilling to recognize such a duty without explicit evidence of Congressional
intent."I'
Applying these principles to the matter before it, the Court held that Chiarella's
silence was not fraudulent because he was not subject to a duty to disclose-or-abstain." °
u" Shapiro, 495 F.2d at 236.
n ° Id. at 238. The court stated, "With respect to the selling defendants (the trading "tippees"),
Texas Gulf strongly suggests that the same duty to 'abstain or disclose' should be imposed upon them,"
Id. at 237.
' 20 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
'n Id. at 224- 25.
'" Id. at 224.
123 Id .
' 24 Id.
"s Id. at 228.
"6 Id. at 227-28.
"7 Id. at 235. The Court noted that la]pplication of a duty to disclose prior to trading
guarantees that corporate insiders, who have an obligation to place the shareholder's welfare before
their own, will not benefit personally through fraudulent use of material, nonpublic information." Id.
'" Id. at 233.
' 2° Id.
' 3° Id. at 232.
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The Court stated that no duty could arise under the facts of the case because no fiduciary
relationship existed between Chiarella and the target companies' shareholders. Chiarella
could not be termed an insider since he had received no confidential inside information
from the target companies themselves.' 3 ' He also was not an agent of the selling share-
holders or a person in whom they had placed their trust. 133 In short, the Court could find
no basis upon which to hold that a fiduciary relationship existed between Chiarella and
the selling shareholders. Absent a fiduciary relationship, the Court was unwilling to
impose any liability for trading on the undisclosed information. While the Court in
Chiarella was not. presented with the issue of tippee liability because Chiarella obtained the
nonpublic information as a result of his own efforts, it observed in a footnote that tippees
of corporate insiders have been held liable under Rule 10b-5 because of their failure to
disclose nonpublic inside information before trading.' 33 The Court stated that the imposi-
tion of the Rule 10b-5 duty upon tippees could be viewed as arising from the tippee's role
as a "participant after the fact" in the insider's breach of his fiduciary duty.'"
I n Chiarella, therefore, the Supreme Court recognized the possibility that tippees who
silently trade on material inside information could be held liable under Rule 10b-5. The
acceptance by the Chiarella Court of the fiduciary theory as the basis for the imposition of
the duty to disclose-or-abstain presented a conceptual problem, however, when tippee
liability was considered. Unlike the trading insider, the tippee has no pre-existing
fiduciary relationship with the shareholders of the affected corporation. After Chiarella,
the question still remained of how a tippee could acquire the fiduciary relationship
necessary to impose liability under Rule 10b-5. This question was presented to the
Supreme Court in Dirks tr. SEC.' -
II. DIRKS u. SEC
A. The Majority Opinion
In a six-to-three decision, the Supreme Court reversed the District of Columbia
Circuit Court's ruling that Raymond Dirks, as a tippee of corporate insiders, was liable
under Rule 10b-5 for failing to disclose material inside information before recommend-
ing the sale of Equity Funding securities to others. The majority opinion, written by
Justice Powell,' 3" began by outlining the requirements necessary for establishing a viola-
tion of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 by corporate insiders.'" The Court noted that this
explication was a necessary first step in defining tippee liability under Rule 10b-5, because
tippee liability would be predicated on the insider's duty to disclose-or-abstain. 08 Accord-
ing to the Court, the insider's act of tipping must first constitute a breach of the insider's
fiduciary duty to disclose-or-abstain under Rule 10b-5 before the tippee can inherit such a
diny. 139
13i id.
132 Id.
1" Id.
134
 Id, at 230 n.12 (citing Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228,
237-38 (2d Cir. 1974)).
135 103 S. Ct. 3255 (1983).
' 343 Justice Powell delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief justice Burger and justices
White, Rehnquist, Stevens and O'Connor joined.
131
 Id. at 3260-61.
138 Id. at 3264-65.	 r.
139 Id. at 3265.
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The Court laid die foundation for establishing the basis of a tippee's duty to
disclose-or-abstain by first affirming the principles established in Chiarella regarding
insider liability under Rule 10b-5. 1 " The Court reiterated that the two elements set out by
the SEC in Cady, Roberts, the existence of a relationship providing access to inside
information and the unfairness of allowing a corporate insider to profit from trading
without disclosure, were necessary for imposing a duty to disclose inside information
under Rule 10b-5."' The Dirks Court noted that Chiarella made clear that the mere
possession of nonpublic market information does not create a duty to disclose under Rule
106-5. According to the Dirks Court, the duty to disclose such information depends upon
the existence of a fiduciary relationship between the parties and "not merely on one's
ability to acquire information in the market." 14" In addition, the Dirks Court stated that the
breach of the insider's fiduciary duty must involve market manipulation or deception to
be actionable under Rule 101)-5." 3 This latter requirement, the Court explained, is
present in the case of insider trading because of the inherent unfairness involved when an
insider takes advantage of information intended solely for corporate purposes. The
Court concluded that an insider's duty to disclose under Rule I Ob-5 arises "only when he
fails to disclose material .nonpublic information before trading on it and thus makes
`secret profits.' "1.14
The Dirks Court explained that its affirmation of Chiarella's rejection of the informa-
tion theory was supported by both the lack of evidence of Congressional intent for
adoption of such a broad theory of liability under Rule 10b-5, and the inhibiting effect
such a theory would have on securities analysts' investigative efforts in the future. 145 The
Court recognized the important function analysts serve in determining the proper market
value of a corporation's securities." 6 The Court stated that analysts enhance market
efficiency in pricing through their efforts to "ferret out and analyze information" by
interviewing corporate officers and other insiders.' 47 According to the Court, the infor-
mation obtained as a result of such interviews is often the basis for judgments about the
value of' a corporation's securities, which judgments are communicated to the analysts'
clients."8 The nature of the public markets, the Court continued, is that this information
140 Id. at 3263. See supra notes 120-34 and accompanying text.
141 M. at 3260. See supra notes 83.94 and accompanying text.
14.2 Id. at 3261. The Court stated, 'Not to require such a fiduciary relationship, we recognized,
would `depar[t] radically from the established doctrine that duty arises from a specific relationship
between two parties' and would amount to 'recognizing a general duty between all participants in
market transactions to forgo actions based on material, nonpublic information.' "Id. (quoting United
States v. Chiarella, 445 U.S. 222, 233 (1980)).
143 Dirks, 103 S. Ct. at 3261 (citing Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 472 (1977)).
144 Dirks, 103 S. Ct. at 3261. (quoting In re Cady, Roberts, & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 916 n.31 (1961)).
145 Dirks, 103 S. Ct. at 3262-63. The Court noted that Congress had exempted many market
professionals from statutory prohibitions under the 1934 Act. Id. The Court interpreted such
exemptions to be Congressional "recognition that {market professionals] contribute to a fair and
orderly marketplace at the same time they exploit the informational advantage that comes from their
possession of [nonpublic information]." Id. (quoting United States v. Chiarella, 445 U.S. 222, 233
n.16 (1980)).
14" Dirks, 103 S. Ct. at 3263. The SEC itself in the lower administrative proceedings had stated in
its opinion, The value to the entire market of [the analyst's] efforts cannot be gainsaid; market
efficiency in pricing is significantly enhanced by [their] initiatives to ferret out and analyze informa-
tion, and thus the analyst's work redounds to the benefit of all investors." Dirks, 21 S.E.C. Docket at
1406.
147 Dirks, 103 S. Ct. at 3263.
148 Id.
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is not simultaneously available to all investors, but instead, only becomes apparent
through trading that takes place in the corporation's securities. 149 Noting the significant
role that Dirks' investigative efforts had played in correcting a serious inaccuracy in the
valuation of Equity Funding's securities, the Court reasoned that analysts would be much
less likely to conduct such investigative efforts if' the Court imposed a general duty to
disclose on all individuals in possession of nonpublic information.'"
Though firmly rejecting the information theory, the Court recognized that its re-
liance on the fiduciary theory as the basis for imposing a duty of disclosure on insiders
presented an analytic problem in determining how a tippee acquires the Rule 10b-5 duty
to disclose-or-abstain.'m Noting that tippees, unlike insiders, have no pre-existing
fiduciary duties to the corporation or its shareholders, the Court made clear, however,
that its rejection of the information theory did not mean that tippees were free to trade on
inside information under all circumstances.'" If tippees had this freedom, the Court
explained, insiders prohibited personally from profiting from their inside knowledge
could profit by proxy by tipping an outsider under a quid pro quo arrangement.'" Thus,
according to the Court, an outsider who knowingly participates in an insider's breach of
his fiduciary duty is subject to the duty to disclose-or-abstain.'" The Court stated that the
outsider's, or tippee's, duty to disclose is derived from the insider's duty to disclose.'" The
Court emphasized that a tippee assumes an insider's duty to disclose, not because of his
'" Id.
's° Id. at 3263 n.18.
"I Id, at 3261.
'" Id. The Court distinguished the circumstances present in Dirks from those present in Shapiro,
where the tippee had gained access to inside information as a result of a confidential relationship. Id.
at 3261 n.14.
'" Id. at 3263-64.
'4 Id. See Mosser v. Darrow, 341 U.S. 267, 271 (1951) (allowing trustee to profit by proxy "would
open up opportunities for devious dealings in the name of others that the trustee could not conduct
in his own"). See also SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 1005 (1971), where the court stated:
Without such a remedy, insiders could easily evade their duty to refrain from trading
on the basis of inside information. Either the transactions so traded could be concluded
by a relative or an acquaintance of the insider, or implied understandings could arise
under which reciprocal tips between insiders in different corporations could be given.
Id. at 1308.
See also Jackson v. Smith, 254 U.S. 586, 589 (1921) (all who knowingly participate with trustee in
breach of duty toward trustees beneficiary are jointly and severally liable to beneficiary for all
profits); Jackson v. Ludeling, 88 U.S. 616, 629, 631 (1874) (outsiders who join corporate insiders in
breach of duty are liable to shareholders); RESTATEMENT (SEcoNo) OF AGENCY §§ 387, 391 (1958)
(agent cannot assist another in taking advantage of his principal).
'" Dirks, 103 S. Ct. at 3264. Professor Loss, who first coined the term "tippee," traced tippee
liability to the concept in restitution that " '[w]here a fiduciary in violation of his duty to the
beneficiary communicates confidential information to a third person, the third person, if he had
notice of the violation of duty, holds upon a constructive trust for the beneficiary any profit which he
makes through the use of such information.' " 3 L. Loss, supra note 4, at 1451 (quoting RESTATEMENT
OF RESTITUTION § 201(2) (1937)).
Other authorities have also supported the principle that tippee liability exists only where there
has first been a breach of trust by an insider. See Ross v. Licht, 263 F. Supp. 395, 410 (S.D.N.Y. 1973)
("tippees" defined as "persons given information by insiders in breach of trust and subject to the
same duty as insiders"); Brudney, supra note 15, at 348; Fleischer, Mundheim, and Murphy, An
Initial Inquiry into the Responsibility to Disclose Market Information, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 798, 818 and n.76
(1973) [hereinafter cited as Fleischer, Mundheim, and Murphy].
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mere possession of inside information, but because he obtained that information impro-
perly through the insider's breach of his fiduciary duty.".6 The majority stated that
tipping could be viewed simply as an indirect means of violating the Cady, Roberts
disclose
-or-abstain duty.'"
The final step in the Court's analysis of tippee liability was a determination of the
circumstances under which an insider's tip constitutes a breach of the insider's fiduciary
duty.' 55 The Court stated that not all disclosures of inside information are inconsistent
with the duty insiders Owe to shareholders.'" The Court focused on the second clement
given in Cady, Roberts, the unfairness of allowing an insider to use inside information for
personal gain, as the basis for determining which corporate disclosures constitute a
breach The Court stated that the proper test is whether the insider personally be-
nefited, either directly or indirectly, from his disclosure of the nonpublic information.'" 1
Under this test, according to the Court, unless the insider derives some personal benefit
from his disclosure, there has beers no breach by the insider of his .fiduciary duty to the
stockholders.'" Without a breach by the insider, the Court explained, there can he no
derivative breach by the tippee.'" The Court stated that the determination of whether a
breach of duty by the insider has occurred will depend on objective criteria, such as
whether the insider received a pecuniary gain or a reputational benefit that would
translate into future earnings.'" Consequently, whether an insider personally benefits
from a particular disclosure will be a question of fact which the courts will have to
determine from the objective facts and circumstances of each case.'"'
Applying these principles to the facts before it, the Court held that Raymond Dirks'
actions had not violated Rule lOb-5.'" Rule 1013 - 5 liability could not be imposed on Dirks
based on a pre-existing fiduciary relationship he had had with Equity Funding's share-
holders since, as the Court explained, neither Secrist nor the Equity Funding insiders who
had corroborated his allegations had disclosed the information to Dirks with the expecta-
tion that Dirks would keep it confidential.'" In addition, suggesting possibly another basis
1•6 Dirks, 103 S. Ct. at 3264.
'57 id.
'Sn Id. ;Lt 3265.
159 id .
liso
' 6 ' The Court provided the following as examples of personal benefits: pecuniary gain, en-
hanced reputation which would translate into future earnings, gifts of inside information to friends
or relatives, or, in general, any quid pro quo transaction. Id. at 3266.
162 Id. at 3265. The Court cited, as an example of a case in which disclosure by an insider did not
impose any fiduciary duties upon the tippee, Walton v. Morgan Stanley and Co„ 623 1 7.2d 796 (2d
Cir. 1989). In Walton, the Second Circuit held that an investment banking firm did not acquire a
fiduciary duty to a target corporation which was not a client when it traded in the corporation's stock
on the basis of confidential earnings reports it acquired from the corporation while investigating it as
a takeover possibility for a client. Id. at 798-99. The Walton court found that the investment banking
firm had received the information legitimately, and, though it had been expected to keep such
information confidential, the corporation had not secured an agreement that the firm would do so.
Id. The court held that in the absence of any confidentiality agreement, or other fiduciary relation-
ship, the investment hankers did not acquire any duty with respect to this information simply by
receiving it legitimately. Id. at 799.
' 63
 Dirks, 103 S. Ct. at 3266.
164 Id.
165 ird,
16" Id. at 3267.
' 67 Id. Though the Court did not cite Shapiro, the Second Circuit in Shapiro stated that since the
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for imposing Rule 10b-5 liability, the Court noted that Dirks had not misappropriated or
illegally obtained the information from Equity Funding.'" Finally, the Court found that
Dirks had not become derivatively liable under Rule 10b-5 since neither Secrist nor the
other Equity Funding insiders had received a personal benefit by disclosing news of the
Equity Funding fraud to Dirks, or had intended to make a gift of such information to
Dirks.'" The Court concluded that the sole purpose of Secrist's and the other insiders'
disclosures was to expose the fraud.'" Since they had not breached the fiduciary duty they
owed to the Equity Funding shareholders, the Court stated that there could be no
derivative breach by their recipient, Dirks."' The Court held, therefore, that because
Dirks was not "a participant after the fact" in a breach of fiduciary duty by Secrist or the
other Equity Funding insiders, he had no duty to disclose-or-abstain under Rule 10b-5. 17'=
B. The Dissenting Opinion
Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, dissented in Dirks v.
SEC.'" The dissent disagreed with the majority's opinion that an insider, in disseminating
nonpublic material information, must be motivated by personal gain for his action to
constitute a breach of his fiduciary duty.'' Instead, the_dissent interpreted the relation-
ship of trust and confidence between an insider and the corporation's shareholders, which
was recognized in Chiarella as the basis of the Rule 10b-5 duty,"' as imposing on an insider
the broad duty to take no action which would unfairly harm the corporation's sharehold-
ers."' Under the dissent's interpretation, an insider's motive for tipping inside informa-
tion is immaterial because the focus of the disclose-or-abstain duty is the prevention of
harm to shareholders as a result of unequal access to nonpublic inside information.'"
Whether an insider profited or intended to profit from the disclosure would not be a
factor, in the dissent's view, in determining whether he breached his fiduciary duty.'"
defendant-tippees knew or should have known of the confidential nature of the earnings informa-
tion on which they traded, they were under a duty not to trade in the affected stock without first
publicly disclosing the information. Shapiro, 495 F.2d at 238.
l as Dirks, 103 S. Ct. at 3267. This conclusion by the Court suggests that misappropriation of
confidential information may give rise to a fiduciary duty. In Chiarella, the employee of the printer
had in effect stolen the information he traded on, but since this issue was not properly presented to
the jury, the Court did riot address it. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 235-37. In their respective dissenting and
concurring opinions in Chiarella, however, Chief Justice Burger and Justice Brennan suggested that a
fiduciary duty may arise with respect to nonpublic material information when the information is
obtained by unlawful means. Id. at 239-43 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Id. at 238-39 (Brennan, J.,
concurring). The Chief Justice stated, and Justice Brennan agreed, that a disclosure obligation
should exist "when an informational advantage is obtained, not by superior experience, foresight, or
industry, but by some unlawful means." Id. at 240 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
1 ' Dirks, 103 S. Ct. at 3267.
170 Id. at 3267-68.
' 71 Id. at 3268.
172 Id.
1 " Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
' 74
 Id. at 3270.
175 Id.
'" Id. at 3270. The dissent cited the second element of Cady, Roberts in support of its interpreta-
tion, stating that the second element addressed the harm against which the duty to disclose-or-abstain
was meant to protect, i.e., the unfairness to shareholders when an insider trades without disclosure.
Id. at 3271 n.8.
177 Id. at 3271.
' 7" Id. The dissent supported this interpretation by stating that personal gain is referred to only
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The dissent found support for its view that personal gain is not an element of an
insider's breach of fiduciary duty in the Supreme Court's earlier decision in Mosser v.
Darrow. 1 i9
 In Mosser, a reorganization trustee was found personally liable for allowing two
key employees to profit from trading in securities of the debtor's subsidiaries even though
the trustee had neither personally profited nor disclosed the information for fraudulent
purposes.'" According to the dissent, Mosser stands for the proposition that a breach of
fiduciary duty occurs whenever a fiduciary acts in a manner which is disadvantageous to
the person to whom he owes a duty. 16 ' Applying this principle to the facts in Dirks, the
dissent found that Secrist breached his duty to the purchasers of Equity Funding shares
when he disclosed the information to Dirks knowing that it would be passed on to
investors.'" The dissent reasoned that Secrist tipped Dirks with the intention that Dirks'
clients would sell their stock to uninformed purchasers of Equity Funding stock, to whom
Secrist, as an insider, owed a duty of disclosure.'" The dissent went on to assert that
because Dirks knew of the breach by Secrist, Dirks should have been held liable as a
"participant after the fact."'"
After finding that the majority had no basis in law for imposing a motivational factor
on the test for determining whether an insider has breached his fiduciary duty, the dissent
also disagreed with the policy upon which the majority's ruling rested.'" Although
conceding that Dirks had played a significant role in exposing the Equity Funding fraud,
the dissent did not agree with the majority that Dirks and his clients should be allowed to
profit from such inside information at the expense of the Equity Funding shareholders)"
The dissent stated that Dirks, as a citizen, had an ethical obligation to disclose the
in the first element in Cady, Roberts. According to the dissent, the second element in Cady, Roberts,
which addresses the injury to the shareholder, is not limited by the personal gain requirement. Id. at
3271 n.9.
341 U.S. 267 (1951).
' 8" Id. at 268, 275.
'81 Dirks, 103 S. Ct. al 3272. The dissent noted, however, that the duty of a trustee not to
misapprOpriate the trust's assets differs from the duty owed to shareholders by an insider. Id. at
3272 n.12. Trustees, for example, are held to a higher standard of care than scienter, the standard
applied in Rule 10b-5 actions. id, (citing 3 A. Scorr ON TRUSTS 5 201, at 1650 (1967)). In addition,
trustees are not permitted to trade in the securities of the corporation in trust. Dirks, 103 S. Ct. at
3272 n.12.
"3 103 S. Ct. at 3274.
"3 Id. at 3270. The SEC in Cady, Roberts stated that an insider's Rule 10b-5 duty extended to
purchasers of the corporation's securities as well as to existing shareholders. 40 S.E.C. at 913-14. The
SEC embraced the earlier reasoning of judge Learned Hand that,
[T]he director or officer assumed a fiduciary relation to the buyer by the very sale; for it
would be a sorry distinction to allow him to use the advantage of his position to induce
the buyer into the position of a beneficiary although he was forbidden to do so once the
buyer had become one.
Id. at 914 n.23 (quoting Gratz v. Claughton, 187 F.2d 46, 49 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 341 U.S. 920
(1951)).
The Supreme Court in Chiarella cited with approval the proposition the SEC drew from the
Gratz decision that an insider's fiduciary duties extended to purchasers of the corporation's securities.
Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 227 n.8.
1" 103 S. Ct. at 3270.
"5 Id. at 3272-73. The majority had observed that Secrist and Dirks had prevented the fraud
from continuing and thus, although some shareholders had been hurt, many more potential inves-
tors had been saved from similar harm. Id. at 3267-68 n.27.
' 86 Id. at 3273.
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information to the SEC.'" The dissent viewed the majority's opinion as rewarding, rather
than punishing, Dirks for his personal use of the inside information.'" Although the
dissent recognized that the SEC had failed to provide clear guidelines for determining the
precise nature of the disclosure necessary to satisfy the disclose-or-abstain duty,'" the
dissent did not agree with the majority's decision to remedy the SEC's deficiencies by
limiting the scope of the insider's fiduciary duty to shareholders.'" In the dissent's view,
Secrist violated his fiduciary duty to the corporation's shareholders when he transmitted
the information to Dirks, knowing that Dirks would advise his clients to trade on the
information. The dissent concluded that Dirks was under a duty to either make this
information public or refrain from recommending the sale of Equity Funding shares to
others, and therefore lie violated Rule I Ob-5 when he caused his clients to sell their Equity
Funding securities.
III. INTERPRETING THE DIRKS OPINION
In Dirks, the Supreme Court held that a tippee's liability under Rule 10b-5 is based
upon the tippee's participation after the fact in an insider's breach of his fiduciary duty."'
Specifically, the Court stated that an insider breaches his fiduciary duty under Rule 10b-5
when he discloses nonpublic material information for the improper purpose of personal
gain."' Under the majority's holding, unless the insider personally profits by his disclo-
sure, he has not breached his fiduciary duty to the stockholders, and the tippee cannot
inherit a derivative duty to disclose-or-abstain. In contrast, the dissent in Dirks maintained
that an insider breaches his fiduciary duty whenever his disclosure of inside information
results in harm to the shareholders.' The dissent focused on the consequences of the
insider's action rather than his motivation for disclosing the information. Despite this
disagreement, both the majority and the dissent tied the imposition of the Rule 10b-5
duty to disclose-or-abstain on tippees to a breach by an insider of his fiduciary duty to the
shareholders. 19 ' The major difference between the opinions lies in the interpretation each
gives to what constitutes a breach of duty by an insider.
The majority stated that the test for determining if an insider has breached his duty
to the stockholders is ascertaining whether the insider has personally benefited, directly
or indirectly, from his disclosure. 195 In determining whether a fraudulent purpose was
the motivation for the insider's disclosure, the Court stressed that objective criteria would
be used.'" The Court provided guidance to the trial courts in making this determination
by suggesting several circumstances which would clearly lead to a determination of a
breach of duty by an insider. Factors which the Court indicated would constitute a breach
of duty were the receipt by the insider of a pecuniary gain or reputational benefit as a
result of the disclosure, the existence of a relationship between the insider and the tippee
1 " Id.
198 Id.
'" The SEC has stated that proper disclosure requires public release through public media
designed to reach the investing public. See In re Faberge, Inc., 45 S.E.C. 249, 256 (1973).
'" Dirks, 103 S. Ct. at 3273-74.
Id. at 3268.
'" Id. at 3265.
' Id. at 3271.
'" Id. at 3264, 3270.
'" Id. at 3265. See supra notes 158-65 and accompanying text.
1" Id. at 3266.
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suggesting a quid pro quo or the intention by the insider to confer a benefit, such as a gift of
confidential information, on a particular tippee.'" The majority found support for its
decision to condition the determination of whether the insider has breached his fiduciary
duty on a showing that the purpose of the disclosure was fraudulent in the SEC's decision
in Cady, Roberts . 198 in Cady, Roberts, the SEC stated that a significant purpose of the 1934
Act was to dispel the idea that the use of nonpublic inside information for personal
advantage was a fringe benefit of corporate office.'" This statement demonstrated, in the
majority's view, that the SEC had already set the standard for determining a breach of
duty by an insider by identifying the elimination of personal benefit from insider use of
corporate information as a major purpose of the federal securities laws.
The dissent disagreed with the majority's insertion of a motivational requirement
into the fiduciary duty doctrine under Rule 10b-5. According to the dissent, an insider
breaches his duty to the shareholders whenever his actions harm the shareholders un-
fairly."' ) Because Secrist breached his duty to the shareholders by disclosing inside
information to Dirks to the financial injury of some Equity Funding shareholders, the
dissent would have found Dirks liable. The dissent analogized Secrises duty to the
corporation's shareholders to a trustee's duty to the corporation not to mismanage its
assets, the situation presented in the Supreme Court's earlier decision in Masser v.
Darrow."61 In Mosser, the dissent pointed out, the trustee was held liable for activities of
employees under him who traded on inside information even though the trustee did not
personally benefit.'" Although the dissent cited Mosser for the proposition that the motive
of personal gain is not essential to a trustee's liability, its reliance on the opinion in
determining an insider's duty under Rule 10b-5 is somewhat misplaced." 03 The difference
between the duties of a trustee and those of an insider is significant enough to substantially
weaken the dissent's use of Mosser as support for its position that an insider's motivation is
irrelevant. For example, trustees are held to a higher standard of care than scienter, the
standard to which insiders are held in Rule 10b-5 actions."" In addition, trustees are
prohibited from trading personally in securities of the corporation in trust under any
circumstances."°s
As the majority in Dirks observed, the dissent's focus on shareholder injury in
determining whether an insider has breached his fiduciary duty amounted to an adoption
of the information theory explicitly rejected by the Court in Chiarella . 2" As indicated
previouSly, under the information theory, anyone who buys or sells securities based on
material inside information which is not generally available to other investors violates
Rule 10b-5 because his trading results in financial injury to less informed traders.'; 04 In
197 id,
'" Id. at 3265.
199 Cady, Roberts, 40 S.E.C. at 912 n.15.
20" Dirks, 103 S. Ct. at 3272.
901 341 U.S. 267 (1951).
2" Dirks, 103 S. Ct. at 3272.
Id. at 3272 n.12.
2" Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfclder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976). The Supreme Court in Ernst &Ernst used
the term "scienter" to describe a mental state embracing the intent to deceive, manipulate or defraud.
Id. at 193. The Court made clear that negligence would not constitute scienter. Id. at 214.
905 Dirks, 103 S. Ct. at 3272 n.12; see Mosser v. Darrow, 341 U.S. 267, 271 (1951). See also
Langevoort, Insider Trading and the Fiduciary Principle: A Post-Chiarella Restatement, 70 CALIF. L. Ray.
I, 2 n.5 (1982).
2°6 Dirks, 103 S. Ct. at 3267 n.27.
2" Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 232. See supra text accompanying notes 29-31.
1080	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 25:1059
both Chiarella and Dirks, the Court rejected the concept that unfairness due to informa-
tional inequality is the basis of Rule 10b-5 liability. Previously, in Santa Fe Industries v.
Green, the Court had stated that all instances of financial unfairness to shareholders do
not violate Rule 10b-5.'°° The effect of the dissent's construction of an insider's breach as
disclosure resulting in harm to the shareholders is to adopt indirectly the information
theory expressly rejected by these earlier decisions. Moreover, in virtually all cases, an
insider's disclosure of nonpublic material information to a tippee will result in some harm
to the shareholders if the tippee trades on that information without disclosure or tips to
other traders who do the same. This proposition is true because, by definition, "material"
information is information which would have a significant impact on a reasonable inves-
tor's assessment of a security's risk and worth.'" Most investors, therefore, would require
some adjustment to the price of the securities being traded if they were aware of the
insider's information. The dissent argued that a tippee's mere possession of inside
information received from an insider automatically imposes on the tippee the Rule 10b-5
duty to disclose-or-abstain. In contrast, under the majority opinion, a tippee is bound by
the Rule 10b-5 duty only when an insider has first breached his fiduciary duty by
disclosing inside material information for the improper purpose of personal gain. Absent
this improper purpose, a tippee can trade freely without disclosure.
As a practical matter, the difference between the majority's and dissent's interpreta-
tions of what constitutes a breach by an insider when he tips inside information will, in
many circumstances, be nonexistent. The objective test employed by the majority in
determining when an insider has improperly disclosed inside information is a far-
reaching one. Under an objective scrutiny, the number of circumstances under which an
insider will be able to argue successfully that he received no direct or indirect pecuniary or
reputational benefit will be few. For example, the majority stated that gifts of inside
information to friends or relatives or anyone with whom the insider maintained a
relationship suggesting a quid pro quo from the recipient or an intention to benefit that
recipient would be prohibited."° Furthermore, the majority, in an attempt to narrow any
potential loophole created by its decision, stated that persons such as underwriters,
accountants, lawyers and consultants, who enter into special confidential relationships
with a corporation and are given access to inside information solely for corporate pur-
poses, will be treated as tippers rather than tippees for Rule 10b-5 purposes.'" Under this
latter restriction, a corporation's provision of information to an underwriter, for example,
for a proper purpose will not protect the underwriter who tips or trades for personal
profit from Rule 10b-5 liability. By occupying a close relationship to the corporation, the
underwriter acquires a fiduciary duty to the corporation's shareholders. Consequently, in
most cases, the insider will be found to have breached his fiduciary duty by improperly
disclosing inside information, and tippee liability will be found under both the majority's
and the dissent's interpretations.
The difference in result between the interpretations of the two opinions arises under
2" Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 474 (1977) (breach of fiduciary duty by
officer, director, or controlling shareholder which does not involve misrepresentation or nondisclo-
sure does not violate Rule 10b-5, even if breach is in connection with purchase or sale of stock).
205 Professor Lorie states: "With respect to the analysis of securities, information is anything that
changes the investor's subjective probability distribution with respect to future market prices or
returns." Lorie, Insider Trading: Rule 10b-5, Disclosure, and Corporate Privacy: A Comment, 9 J. LEGAL
STUD. 819, 820 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Lorie].
"° Dirks, 103 S. Ct. at 3266.
2" Id. at 3261 n.14.
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a factual situation such as the one found in Dirks involving the disclosure of information
regarding securities fraud. When consideration is given to the possibility that the Equity
Funding fraud could have continued undetected had Secrist not disclosed the informa-
tion to Dirks, the real import of the interpretive difference can be understood and
appreciated.'"' The SEC's failure to act when contacted by Secrist about the ongoing
fraud bears out this conclusion. This failure to act may have been in large part due to the
SEC's lack of sufficient investigative staff to pursue information it receives regarding
securities fraud. Thus, even if the SEC's decision in Cady, Roberts had not provided the
legal precedent to support the majority's definition of what constitutes an insider's breach
in tipping inside information, public policy grounds alone would have supported allowing
insiders to tip information regarding fraud within their corporation to others who would
investigate and verify such information. Because society as a whole benefits from such
disclosures, the cost incurred by shareholders due to their informational inequality is
justified. The next section of the casenote will consider the beneficial impact the Dirks
decision will have on providing an incentive for securities analysts to investigate tips they
receive regarding securities fraud.
IV. 'THE IMPACT OF DIRKS ON FUTURE INVESTIGATIVE EFFORTS BY SECURITIES ANALYSTS
A major concern of the federal securities laws, and especially of section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5 of the 1934 Act, is the prevention of fraud and the resulting loss of investor
confidence in the securities market."" Establishing incentives for securities analysts to
investigate securities fraud is an important step in achieving these purposes.'" The
majority in Dirks recognized the significant role analysts play in maintaining the integrity
of the market. In addition, the Court recognized the deleterious effect an adoption of the
information theory would have on this role.'" The majority's decision to affirm Chiarella's
rejection of the information theory was supported by the policies underlying government
regulation of the public securities markets. Adoption by the Court of the information
theory, which would impose Rule 1011-5 liability on tippees based on mere possession of
inside information received from an insider, would have removed the financial incentive
for analysts, such as Dirks, to ferret out information on fraudulently valued securities.
Additionally, imposing a broad disclose-or-abstain duty upon tippees would not always
result in more information reaching all investors through public disclosure. It is impor-
tant to remember that an option exists under Rule 10b-5 to either disclose or abstain.
50 Id. at 3263 n.18.
' 0 See Brudney, supra note 15, at 334; Fleischer, Mundheim, and Murphy, supra note 155, at
816-17; Scott, Insider Trading: Rule 10b-5, Disclosure and Corporate Privacy, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 801,
805-09 (1980).
'" Fleischer, Mundheim, and Murphy, supra note 155, at 816-17. See also Note, The Efficient
Capital Market Hypothesis, Economic Theory and the Regulation of the Securities Industry, 29 STAN. L. REV.
1031, 1054-55 (1977).
2 " Dirks, 103 S. Ct. at 3263. The Court stated:
Imposing a duty to disclose or abstain solely because a person knowingly receives
material nonpublic information from an insider and trades on it could have an inhibit-
ing influence on the role of market analysts, which the SEC itself recognizes is necessary
to the preservation of a healthy market. It is commonplace for analysts to 'ferret out
and analyze information,' ... la]nd information that the analysts obtain normally may
be the basis for judgments as to the market worth of a corporation's securities.
Id. (quoting In re Raymond L. Dirks, 21 S.E.C. Docket 1401, 1406).
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Dirks, for example, would not necessarily have disclosed rather than abstained from
recommending to others that they sell their Equity Funding stock had he been subject to
the Rule I Ob-5 duty. Had he known that the expenses he would incur to investigate the
Equity Funding fraud would be made without any opportunity for recoupment for his
effort, Dirks might rationally have elected to abstain. The fraud at Equity Funding,
therefore, might have continued undetected, causing an even larger number of share-
holders to suffer eventual losses.' If analysts are not allowed to reap the fruits of their
investigative efforts, they may be unwilling to incur the cost of investigation, thereby
allowing securities fraud to continue unabated.
The major argument against allowing tippees to trade on the information they
receive is that such a policy would offend basic notions of fair play and undermine
investor confidence in the market. A cost-benefit analysis of imposing the Rule 10b-5 duty
on tippees who possess material nonpublic information regarding securities fraud, how-
ever, does not support the adoption of the information theory. The suggested benefit of
imposing a broad disclose-or-abstain duty on all tippees under the information theory is
that this standard will reduce, if not eliminate, the trading losses of less experienced
investors when trading with better informed, more sophisticated market participants."'
Although this parity in access to market information would be a significant benefit, the
cost of adopting the information theory as the basis of tippee liability under Rule 10b-5 is
great. To ensure that relevant information will continue to be uncovered, analyzed and
assimilated into the market, the collectors, especially securities analysts, must be provided
with financial incentives. Imposing a disclose-or-abstain duty upon such individuals when,
as was the case in Dirks, the insider who tipped them did not benefit personally by his
disclosure, would result in less information regarding fraud being uncovered. In most
instances, analysts would abstain from trading rather than incur investigative costs with
no hope of eventual remuneration." Allowing tippees to profit by nondisclosure before
trading or tipping, except in cases in which the insider has breached his fiduciary duty,
not only will preserve incentives for analysts to act on tips regarding securities fraud, but
also will have the residual benefit of assisting in the eradication of fraud from the
securities marke09
' 16 The Dirks Court recognized the weakness of the information theory in protecting the
securities market from fraudulent market values:
[T]he central role . . . analysts in general can play in revealing information that
corporations may have reason to withhold from the public, is an important one . .
[U]ntil the Equity Funding fraud was exposed, the information in the trading market
was grossly inaccurate. But for Dirks' efforts, the fraud might well have gone unde-
tected longer.
Id. at 3263 n.18.
2 " Barry, The Economics of Outside Information and Rule 10b -5, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 1307, 1352
(1981)[hereinafter cited as Barry].
Barry points out that increased regulation "imposes on society the usual administrative costs
associated with government intervention in the economy." Barry, supra note 217, at 1353 n.167.
219 See H. KRIPKE, THE SEC AND CORPORATE DISCLOSURE: REGULATION IN SEARCH OF A PURPOSE
292-97 (1979) (where the author expresses the view that the information theory would be impractical
on a cost-benefit analysis). Kripke states:
The Commission's [proposal] ... represents an ideological effort to achieve a total
equality among buyers and sellers which is unrealistic in a competitive, profitmaking
economy. It is not worth the benefit in terms of the cost, and is severely inhibitive of the
Commission's avowed goal of the free flow of information into the market.
Id. at 297.
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The importance of preserving an incentive for the production of information has
been stressed by a number of legal scholars, particularly Professor Kronnaan. 22° Kronman
states that the greater the probability that the information is of the type that would be
deliberately produced rather than casually discovered, the more reason to apply a blanket
rule permitting use of the information without disclosure."" As defined by Kronman,
deliberately acquired information is information "whose acquisition entails costs which
would not have been incurred but for the likelihood, however great, that the information
in question would actually be produced."'" In contrast, if the costs incurred in acquiring
the information would have been incurred in any case, the information is said to have
been casually acquired. 223 An example of casually acquired information would be inside
information obtained by the tippee as a result of overhearing a conversation between two
corporate officers while dining in the company cafeteria. The cost of acquiring this
information is the cost of the lunch, an expense which would have been incurred by the
tippee anyway. Deliberately acquired information, on the other hand, would be informa-
tion which a tippee, such as Dirks, gathered as a result of investigative efforts after
receiving the initial tip.
Professor Kronman maintains that when information has been deliberately acquired
and its possessor is denied the benefit of profiting from its use, the possessor will have an
incentive to reduce or eliminate his production of such information in the future." 4 This
incentive to reduce or eliminate future efforts arises, according to Kronman, because one
who possesses such deliberately acquired information has incurred costs he would have
avoided but for the prospect of benefits which the duty to disclose-or-abstain would deny
him. Casually acquired information, on the other hand, involves minimal acquisition
costs. Consequently, Kronman points out, the denial of the benefit of profiting from
casually acquired information will have little or no effect on the production of such
information. In the example of casually acquired information given previously, the tippee
will continue to eat lunch in the cafeteria though perhaps expend less energy in the future
eavesdropping on other diners' conversations.
Kronman does not ignore the existence of a societal benefit in compelling disclosure
of all nonpublic material information." 5 A blanket rule requiring disclosure regardless of
the acquisition costs of the information might reduce the number of investors who are
harmed by trading with persons who possess inside information. Achieving this societal
benefit, however, is not without costs. In the case of deliberately acquired information,
Kronman notes, the decline in the production of such information will be great. "s Thus,
information regarding fraudulent activity within a publicly traded corporation which
requires investigative costs of some significance to analysts will be sharply curtailed. When
information of this nature remains undetected, as happened in the case of Equity
Funding, confidence in the integrity of the market will he diminished.
Kronman, Mistake, Disclosure, Information, and the Law of Contracts, 7 j. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1978).
See supra notes 214, 217 and 219 and infra note 229 for citations to other legal scholars who discuss
the need for maintaining an incentive for the production of information impacting upon the
valuation of securities.
'." 1 Id. at 17 - 18.
2" Id. at 13.
2" Id.
74 Id. at 13-14.
f"5 Id. at 14.
Id. at 13-14.
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Kronman suggests assigning a property right in the information itself to the individ-
ual who incurred the costs of its deliberate acquisition. 227 The legal system would establish
Otis property right in the information by permitting the informed party to profit from his
information without disclosure to others.' 28 By assigning a property right in such infor-
mation, the legal system would restore to analysts the incentive to incur the costs of its
production.
By not imposing a broad duty to disclose-or-abstain upon tippees based merely on the
possession of inside information, the Dirks Court has encouraged the production of
deliberately acquired information, such as information obtained concerning fraudulent
activities within a corporation. As the Dirks Court held, when an insider has not benefited
personally as a result of tipping nonpublic information, the tippee will be allowed to profit
from the fruits of his investigative efforts. The tippee will have a property right in the
information in that he will be able to exclude others from the use and enjoyment of such
information. Not only will analysts, the typical investigators of such information, benefit
through the commissions they receive from their clients who trade on such information,
but society as a whole will benefit from a securities market in which a fraud, such as
occurred within Equity Funding, does not remain undetected. 229
In summary, the Dirks Court was correct in affirming Chiarella's rejection of the
information theory and in limiting the imposition of Rule 10b-5 liability on tippees. The
Dirks decision furthers the goals of the federal securities laws by encouraging the produc-
tion and assimilation into the market of relevant 'information by securities analysts, such
as Dirks. This investigative activity, in turn, will result in a securities market freer from
fraud, which can only increase investors' confidence in the market.
CO Nclu
Prior to Chiarella, there was a theoretical controversy between the SEC and the
Second Circuit as to the scope of Rule 106-5 liability. The SEC adopted the "fiduciary"
theory to define the outer limits of the duty to disclose-or-abstain, while the Second
Circuit adopted the more expansive "information" theory. The Supreme Court in
Chiarella v. United States resolved this theoretical conflict by adopting the fiduciary theory
as the basis of insider liability under Rule I Ob-5. The Chiarella Court stated that there is no
duty to disclose-or-abstain in the absence of a fiduciary relationship between the insider
and the purchasing or selling shareholder. After Chiarella, the basis upon which tippees
could be found liable under Rule I Ob-5 was unclear since tippees often do not stand in a
position of trust and confidence with the shareholders of the affected corporation. In
Dirks v. SEC, the Supreme Court clarified the basis for imposing tippee liability under
Rule 10b-5. The Court stated that tippee liability is a derivative form of liability and thus is
m Id. at 14.
"8 Id. at 15.
'" Professor Lorie states:
The main improvements in the system of disclosure will not come from tinkering with
the mandatory system but from encouraging the private quest for information which,
though in detail is immaterial, is in its totality of great commercial importance. We
should see to it that the Raymond Dirkses of the future get gold medals rather than
censure and other punishment.
Lorie, supra note 209, at 822.
September 19841	 CASENOTES •	 1085
dependent upon the insider's breach of his fiduciary duty through disclosure of nonpub-
lic inside information for personal gain.
The Dirks Court was correct in affirming the Chiarella Court's adoption of the
fiduciary theory as the basis for imposing the duty to disclose-or-abstain under Rule
10b-5. By rejecting the information theory as the basis of tippee liability, the Dirks. Court
has limited the number of situations in which analysts must disclose-or-abstain and thus
recognized that public policy is better served by preserving analysts' incentives to ferret
out securities fraud. The effect of adopting the information theory, on the other hand,
would have been to encourage fraud by silencing analysts because of their unwillingness
to incur investigative costs with no hope of eventual remuneration.
ANNE T. FoLEy
